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Abstrak 
Kajian ini mendiskusikan mengenai bagaimana grup-grup sipil menghakimi 
kelompok lain sebagai aliran “sesat” dan bagaimana negara meresponnya dalam 
kasus konflik Sunni-Syiah di Sampang, Madura. Istilah “sesat” telah menjadi 
perhatian penting dalam melihat bagaimana beberapa komunitas memandang 
perbedaan yang lain. Artikel ini memperlihatkan bahwa negara telah merespon 
secara tidak demokratis kepada beberapa penilaian kelompok terhadap Syiah 
sebagai salah satu warga negara yang dilindungi oleh negara. Selain itu, 
rekomendasi MUI yang juga tidak demokratis terhadap negara untuk 
menghentikan komunitas Syiah mempraktikkan ritual mereka juga menjadi 
perhatian, karena hal tersebut melanggar kebebasan beragama dan demokrasi. 
Penelitian ini mengambil beberapa literatur, seperti fatwa MUI, dokumentasi 
kasus Tajul Muluk dalam Catatan Keberagamaan oleh Center for Religious and 
Cross-cultural Studies, dan narasi eskalasi konflik oleh ilmuwan sebelumnya 
sebagai data. Sebagai studi yang melihat dinamika konflik, makalah ini 
membantu ilmuwan, aktivis, dan pemerintah secara kritis memahami hubungan 
antara negara dan kelompok masyarakat sebelum dan selama eskalasi konflik. 
Selain itu, studi ini bisa menjadi analisis kritis terhadap implementasi demokrasi 
di Indonesia. 
 
Kata kunci: Konflik Sunni-Syiah, sekte menyimpang di Indonesia, fatwa, 
demokrasi. 
 
 
Abstract 
The study discusses how civic groups have judged other as deviant in the case of 
Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang, Madura, and how the state has responded to 
it.  The term “deviant” has been an important subject to study in Indonesia 
because it helps us to understand how certain communities other the others who 
are different in terms of religious understandings. This article argues that the 
state has undemocratically responded towards several groups’ judgment on Shiite 
in Sampang of being deviant; while Shiite community in Sampang are Indonesian 
citizen who are subject to the state protection. This situation is further 
exacerbated by the MUI recommendation to the state to stop Shiite community 
from practicing their rituals, as it clearly violates religious freedom and 
democracy. This study uses secondary data in the forms of the MUI fatwa, Tajul 
Muluk case documentation in Catatan Keberagamaan by Center for Religious and 
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Cross-cultural Studies, and the conflict escalation narration by previous scholars. 
As a study focused on the dynamic of the conflict, this paper helps scholars, 
activists, and government critically comprehend the relation between the state 
and civic groups before and during conflict escalation. Further, it becomes 
critical analysis towards the implementation of democracy in Indonesia. 
 
Keywords: Sunni-Shiite conflict, deviant sects in Indonesia, fatwa, Democracy 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 After the fall down of New Order Regime, some inter/intra-religious 
conflicts, intolerant movements and its emergence and beginning for occupying 
public sphere become a common phenomenon of our plurality condition in 
Indonesia. The post-democratization also brought social changes in Indonesian 
religious life. This circumstance also raises some questions whether Indonesia is 
democratic country or not? Where is Pancasila? Does everyone have not 
comprehended about Bhineka Tunggal ika as a motto of national plurality?‖ 
Furthermore, I also emphasize another question; ―where is the State, what has 
state been doing so far?‖ 
 Since the founders of this state decided to take Pancasila as state‘s 
ideology, it explains that all citizens have to realise that they live in diversity and 
plurality. Living in diversity and plurality means to accept differences among 
people. Having differences is not a problem, but problematizing differences are a 
problem. Besides, it also shows the inclusivity of the founders, including those 
from Muslims side. Taking Pancasila as an ideology is one of real act to unite 
Indonesia which has many different ethnics, languages, religions, and many other 
things under one ideology.  
 Considering the question about what state has been doing this far in terms 
of protecting religious freedom, the rights of minority, providing security for all of 
citizens, implementing UUD 1945, Pancasila, and democracy, I take the case of 
Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang and focus on the issue of state neutrality on 
treating its citizens. Exploring more about the state‘s role, as which I emphasize, 
in relation to conflicts among religious adherents, I rise a question related to 
state‘s role and neutrality on implementing democracy and law  that I am 
exploring. How does state respond to civic group‘s judgment of ―deviant‖ in 
public sphere?  
Shiite community has faced persecutions in Indonesia and Sampang case 
is one that went to the court where Tajul Muluk, Shiite leader, was suspected as 
religious blasphemy doer. In Yogyakarta, Al Makin found that the persecution of 
shiite community in Yogyakarta is part of homogenizing Islam movement in 
national context.
1
 This means there is a demand on the orthodoxy of Islam. 
Regarding the blasphemy law that is often used in the court process, there are 
several activists and scholars who have discussed and proposed it for judicial 
                                                          
1
 Al Makin, ―Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: Persecution of the Shia Group in 
Yogyakarta,‖ Studia Islamika Vol 24, no. No 1 (2017): 1–32. 
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review, even though rejected by the Constitutional Court. The rejection then led 
Religious leaders to be able to capitalize their power, legitimacy, and authorities, 
as Melissa Crouch contended.
2
 She argued that the rejection by the court is to 
keep blasphemy policy which then led religious leaders to be unchallenged. 
Another important research questioning the root of religious minorities‘ 
discrimination by Frinke et all argued, that minorities represent the unwanted 
competition against majority religion, supported by the state, which then led to 
discrimination. They are, moreover, viewed as those threatening the larger culture 
and the state.
3
     
 In this case, I consider some theories developed by scholars, such as 
Alfred Stepan, and John Rawls. Stepan‘s theorization of democracy and toleration 
helps me see how state responds to some religious group judgement of ―deviant‖ 
towards other. It also explains how state should treat its citizens, with their 
differences, in the nature of democracy, in favour of harmony between its citizens, 
including those from different religious traditions. Furthermoe, the term ―Public 
Reason‖ is also helpful in looking at how state and its civic organization make and 
should make their reasons reasonable in public.  
    
B. The State and Civic Groups 
 Before going deeper to discuss about how state respond to certain religious 
groups‘ judgement of deviant towards other groups, it is important at first for us to 
define what it means by both state and civic groups here. Since the case I am 
taking is Shiite of Sampang case, and based on data I got from several sources, the 
state here is those institution legalized and recognized as part of state that are 
supposed to play role in managing harmony and political stability based on 
constitution and law. For example, The court is a state since it represents the state 
in processing Tajul Muluk, the leader of Shiite in Sampang, judgement based on 
legitimated law. The last is local government as those responsible in resolving 
conflict escalation as well as written in UU no.7 about resolving social conflict. 
Besides, the government, in this context, also those who have to protect minority 
and religious freedom.  
 Furthermore, what I mean by civic groups in this paper is those non-state 
community who are institutionalized under leadership or guidance of religious 
leader, such as NU, Basrra and any other groups that judge Shiite community in 
Sampang as deviant and recommend the state to also involve in stopping them 
from practicing their teachings and religious activities for the sake of religious 
harmony. They are also those who feel religiously offended then conclude that 
those deviant sects break their teachings, hence should be abolished. Moreover, 
MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/Indonesian Ulama Council) is as civic groups 
                                                          
2
 Melissa Crouch, ―Constitutionalism, Islam and the Practice of Religious Deference: The 
Case of the Indonesian Constitutional Court,‖ March 7, 2016, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2744394. 
3
 Roger Finke, Robert R. Martin, and Jonathan Fox, ―Explaining Discrimination against 
Religious Minorities,‖ Politics and Religion, June 2017, /core/journals/politics-and-
religion/article/explaining-discrimination-against-religious-
minorities/0289FF18ADB221946DD6756560A3F592. 
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representing the voice of Muslims. Besides, members of MUI also played roles in 
serving ummah, in terms of producing fatwa which some believe and implement it 
in daily lives. However, seeing the fact that Muslims are also divided into several 
groups with each different teachings, it becomes problematic when the question 
―which voice of Muslims group should MUI represent?‖ is raised. Not only does 
it become theoretically problematic, but also pragmatically, because members of 
MUI sometimes measure whether or not certain group is deviant by investigating 
them on their own without having dialogue with those of group‘s members 
considered as deviant. This is also what I will be discussing in the next chapter.    
 
 
C. The Religious Group Judgement on Shiite 
 Shiite community has already emerged in Sampang since 1980s and began 
to openly practice in 2004. However, the attack of some people who opposed to 
this community began to emerge in 2006. Following this situation, in 2009, MUI 
Sampang, Danramil, and Kapolsek stated that Shiite was not deviant, because they 
did not find any deviant in the sense that they are different from the basic of 
Islamic mainstream teachings. Even though this community felt secure by this 
statement, in contrast, non-Shiite community became stricter in opposing them.
4
  
 There were three ultimatum offered to Shiite community by people who 
opposed to them when the tension increased in April 2011. They asked them to 
stop practicing their religious activities and go back to the right Islamic teaching, 
which means the Islamic mainstream teachings of Sunni, to leave Sampang 
without compensation of land or any asset they had, if those two options are not 
implemented, then they should die. Responding to this situation, local leader, 
MUI, and Muspida (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah/Local Leaders Forum) tried 
to resolve this problem but failed.
5
 
 Bassra (Badan Silaturrahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura/Pesantren religious 
leaders Forum) and NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) worked together with MUI in 
discussing about how to solve the conflict beginning to escalate. Of Some 
religious leaders who involved in this are; Abuya Ali Karrar Sinhaji, Mudassir, 
Hamid, Fauzan Zain, and Syafiuddin. However, they never directly involved, in 
this period, in the field since they knew the informations about Shiite‘s teachings, 
considered as different, from their students. They started to have some discussion 
with some elites in government, and then also invited Tajul Muluk to encourage 
him to stop spreading and practicing his religion for its deviancy.
6
 
                                                          
4
 Zainal Abidin Bagir et all, Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2012 
(Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2013), 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved
=0ahUKEwi5qP7m57rUAhUBO48KHfqSBFkQFgguMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsinergibangsa.
org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F01%2FLaporan-Tahunan-Kehidupan-
Beragama.pdf&usg=AFQjCNF7dOn-
MI6TWD4VqIUl8H1IICUjkw&sig2=E4hRDq3Ghu6hxjtSCjtvEQ. 
5
 Laporan Tahunan... p.29-30. 
6
 Interview with Lutfillah 24 February 2013. See more Muhammad Afdillah and Ph D. 
Zainal Abidin Bagir, ―DARI MASJID KE PANGGUNG POLITIK; Studi Kasus Peran Pemuka 
Agama Dan Politisi Dalam Konflik Kekerasan Agama Antara Komunitas Sunni Dan Syiah Di 
  
 
22 | Mazahib, Vol XVI, No. 1 (Juni 2017) 
 
 Furthermore, after several dialogs between those of religious leaders with 
the involvement from some government‘s institution, they did not find the 
solution, because Tajul Muluk still insisted to practice his religon. Hence, the 
demonstration by some people opposing him emerged. In response to that, they 
held dialog again. For this time, the judgement of deviant towards Tajul Muluk‘s 
teachings happened. They then appealed the recommendation to local government 
to stop Shiite‘s activities and to relocate them to outside Madura in order to create 
harmony and avoid communal conflict again. 
 In response to the tension between Sunni and Shiite, MUI as civic group 
and that representing Muslims voice decided to involve in it, in favour of religious 
harmony among people in Sampang. They started to find out whether or not Shiite 
teachings are deviant through investigating several books and activities consisting 
Shiite teachings and doctrines.  
 Right after violence conducted by Sunni Muslims towards Shiite in 29 
December 2011, MUI Sampang produced fatwa that Tajul‘s teachings  is deviant 
and considered as blasphemy towards Islam in 1 January 2012 as written in 
035/mui/spg/i/2012. Furthermore, PCNU Sampang also produced statement letter 
supporting fatwa of MUI Sampang. Following fatwa and several supports of 
recognizing Shiite as deviant, in 3 January 2012, Bassra (Badan Silaturrahmi 
Ulama Pesantren Madura/Pesantren religious leaders Forum) asked East Java 
MUI and MUI Centre to produce the same fatwa as well, and then to prohibit 
Shiite community to exist and to spread their teachings in Madura. Not only MUI 
in Sampang but also those from several districts in East Java such as Bangkalan, 
Gresik, Surabaya,  and those representing Sunni, such as Jam‘iyah Ahlussunnah 
wal Jama‘ah Bangil Pasuruan, and GUIB (Gerakan Umat Islam Bersatu/Muslims 
United Movement)   
 Being asked to produce fatwa about Shiite, MUI East Java consequently 
also did it in 14 January 2012 after investigating several teachings and books of 
Shiite, deciding that Shiite Imamiyah Itsna Asyaariyah and other sects of Shiite 
which have the same teaching are deviant and may deviate others. As a result, 
MUI East Java recommended to all Muslims to anticipate and to be aware from 
being influenced by this kind of teachings. They also recommended to the 
government to not support and to stop them spreading teachings. Because 
spreading Shiite teachings among Indonesians as ahlu al-sunnah wa al-jama‘ah 
followers, will cause political instability that will threaten the unity of Republic of 
Indonesia.
7
 After producing such fatwa, MUI East Java also support religious 
leaders BMN in attempt to ask MUI Centre to produce the same fatwa by 
                                                                                                                                                               
Sampang Jawa Timur‖ (Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2013), 90, 
http://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=penelitian_detail&sub=PenelitianDetail&act=view
&typ=html&buku_id=63764. 
7
 ―Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia‖ (Majelis Ulama Indonesia Prov. Jawa 
Timur, No. Kep- /SKF-MUI/JTM/I 2012). 
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facilitating their trip. This was one of real support provided by MUI East Java for 
religious leaders.
8
 
 
D. State’s Response 
1. Local Government (Pemda) 
 Following anti Shiite movement in Sampang that has spread and has 
escalated, religious leaders who opposed to Shiite invited local government to 
discuss about how to solve the problem of Shiite considered as deviant, thus 
should be corrected or even be abolished and government should play roles in 
it. Since religious leaders (Kyai) in Madura also have certain political power to 
mobilize people, even though local government was only guest invitation in 
several discussions, they eventually did not have choices but to follow kyai‘s 
instruction in order to avoid losing vote and support from society.
9
 
 Besides following some forums of Sunni religious leaders, at the end of 
seeking ways to resolve this conflict, the government finally decided to resolve 
it by relocating Shiite community to Sidoarjo using three trucks and two police 
buses with three patrol cars to provide security.
10
  
  Another role of local government that should be considered is Noer Tjahja, 
district head of Sampang, who involved in escalating the conflict. He ruled the 
district from 2008-2012 and ran for re-election in 2012. The challenge of 2012 
election is the fact that he lost in village of Karang Anyam in previous election, 
where many Shiite community lived before the incident. So he had to win this 
area too. Since this re-election was more challenging and more difficult, he had 
no choice but to increase popularity through supporting anti Shiite activities 
that was considered as people‘s interest, because they wanted their village to be 
neutral from deviant sects.
11
 
 Furthermore, his explicit statement about Shiite was delivered through his 
speech during political campaign. He stated that Tajul, the leader of Shiite 
community, was deviant because of not obligating Jumat prayer and allowing 
mut’ah12 marriage and then might lead others to be deviant too. Hence, he 
asked people to be careful with this community and asked police to drive them 
away if they still practice their deviant teachings.
13
 
                                                          
8
 Afdillah and Zainal Abidin Bagir, ―DARI MASJID KE PANGGUNG POLITIK; Studi 
Kasus Peran Pemuka Agama Dan Politisi Dalam Konflik Kekerasan Agama Antara Komunitas 
Sunni Dan Syiah Di Sampang Jawa Timur.‖ 
9
 Afdillah dan Zainal Abidin Bagir, et all, Dari Masjid... p.104–5. 
 
10AH. Semendawai, et all., ―Laporan Tim Temuan dan Rekomendasi (TTR) Tentang 
Penyerangan terhadap Penganut Syiah di Sampang, Madura.‖ See more 
http://www.komnasperempuan.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/LAPORAN-PUBLIK-TIM-
TEMUAN-DAN-REKOMENDASI-TTR-SYIAH-SAMPANG.pdf. 
11
 Iqbal Ahnaf, ―Local Elections and Intolerance: A Lesson from Sampang,‖ CRCS, ICRS 
Universitas Gadjah Mada, May 2014, Volume 3 edition. 
 
12Mut’ah marriage: is a kind of contracted marriage that requires both specific limited 
period and sum of money under the agreement, usually practiced by Shia Islam. However, it is 
rejected by Sunni Islam. See more Thomas Patrick Hughes, A Dictionary of Islam, (New Delhi: 
Asian Educational Services, 2001), p. 424. 
 
13Tjahya‘s speech, 12 February 2012. See more Afdillah, Dari Masjid ke Panggung 
Politik: Studi Kasus Pemuka Agama dan Politisi dalam Konflik Kekerasan Agama antara 
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2. Court  
 In this case, Tajul Muluk was accused as a religious blasphemy doer and 
recognised as deviant for insulting Qur‘an that he said it is not original. For, he 
rejected this accusation that Qur‘an he always use is as same as Qur‘an used by 
other generally. Besides, he was also suspected that his speech was insulting 
the prophet sahabah, such as Abu Bakr, Umar bin al-Khattab, and Utsman bin 
Affan. However, this kind of suspicion is never proved in the court.
14
 
 Thus, in 12 July 2012 he was sentenced by the State Court Sampang with 
two years in prison. This was lighter than was what imposed by Jaksa. 
However, he appealed the case to the State Court Surabaya, yet he recieved 
more severe penalty, four years in prison, then was it before. He appealed 
cassation again in Supreme Court, for the sentence remained and the earlier 
decision was strenghtened.
15
 
  On the other side, the State Court Surabaya also sentenced six suspects of 
attackers towards Shiite community in 26 August 2012. They are; Mukhsin 
with ten months jailed, Mat Safi with one year and six months jailed, Saniawan 
with eight months jailed, Hadiri with for years jailed and the last, Rois Hukama 
as a main suspected, but was not sentenced and was free in 16 April 2013.
16
 
 
E. Challenging Democracy  
 Looking at how state and civic groups encounter with the existence of 
Shiite Community, there are at least two state‘s institution involving in resolving 
this problem. First is the local government who are of course supposed to take 
responsibility in resolving the conflict as mentioned in UU No.7 about resolving 
social dispute. In addition, resolving conflict includes responding religious 
groups‘ judgment towards Shiite. Hence, the way of government respond to this 
religious groups‘ judgment will cause whether it will escalate or be peacefully 
resolved. The second is the court, where Tajul Muluk case took place. This court 
represents state‘s instiution where citizens are equal before the law.  
 Before looking at how MUI, as civic group which receive money from 
government, respond to it, I want to quote what Stepan suggested about 
democracy: 
                                                                                                                                                               
Komunitas Sunni dan Syiah di Sampang Jawa Timur , Central for Religious and Cross-cultural 
Studies, (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University 2013), p. 106.  
 
14
Zinal Abidin Bagir, et all., Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2012, 
(Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2013), p. 63. 
15
 Bagir, Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia 2012, 64. 
 
16AH. Semendawai, et all., ―Laporan Tim Temuan dan Rekomendasi (TTR) Tentang 
Penyerangan terhadap Penganut Syiah di Sampang, Madura.‖ See more 
http://www.komnasperempuan.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/LAPORAN-PUBLIK-TIM-
TEMUAN-DAN-REKOMENDASI-TTR-SYIAH-SAMPANG.pdf 
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―Democracy must also have a constitution that itself is democratic in that it 
respects fundamental liberties and offers considerable protection for 
minority rights.‖17 
 Since the founders of Indonesia took Pancasila as ideology, democracy 
was also chosen and was believed as an adequate system to implement in favour 
of protecting human right of each citizen. Even though Indonesia was under 
authoritarian government for many decades, its citizens have been trying to 
implement the real democracy for better Indonesia. It includes the protection of 
minority and religious freedom as mentioned by Stepan as well as written in UUD 
1945, article 28 about human right. 
 However, if we see MUI in Indonesia, it is a manifestation of special 
privilege for Muslims to serve and to accommodate the interest of Sunni Muslims 
majority in Indonesia. That is why the teaching and certain way of producing 
fatwa is the way of Sunni. If we see historically, it was founded by Suharto 
regime to control ulama for the sake of his own regime. Since it is getting more 
independent now days, the state or government have more distance to it, thus they 
cannot control as much as did Suharto regime. 
 As one of civic groups that should balance the state‘s power in democratic 
way, it becomes problematic when MUI produce fatwa that accommodate some 
Muslims interest on the one hand, but on the other, influence certain people in 
justifying their acts to violate other rights. Or in certain condition, people use 
MUI to support their acts of violating other right, which is incompatible with 
democracy system, referring to Stepan. How can civic group as civil society that 
should support democracy violate minority rights? It also shows that this civil 
society violate UUD 1945 article 28 about human right. 
 Looking at fatwa, stating that Shiite‘s teachings in Sampang is deviant, 
produced by MUI in Madura and East Java, as bodies of the state; it did not 
respect fundamental liberties and did not offer considerable protection for 
minority rights. Besides, they also recommended the government to stop Shiite 
spreading their teachings in Indonesia, considered as that having ahlu al-sunnah 
wa al-jama‘ah followers. Because it will cause political instability that will 
threaten the unity of Republic of Indonesia. In contrast, MUI fatwa actually that 
which cause political instability threatening the implementation of UUD 1945, 
human right and religious freedom, because it support and strengthen violation of 
Shiite community‘s right. 
 I also see the problematic interpretation of religious blasphemy law that 
which considered as deviant and usually is used by MUI to judge certain group. In 
this context, it means if Shiite teachings are different from and incompatible with 
the basic teaching of mainstream teaching, they will be considered as deviant, and 
they are. So difference from the basic teaching is deviant. In fact, before this 
violence emerged, MUI in Madura stated that Shiite was not deviant. This 
interpretation of constitution does not respect the fundamental liberties and does 
not offer protection for minorities‘ right of religious freedom.    
                                                          
17
 Alfred C. Stepan, ―Religion, Democracy, and the ‗Twin Tolerations,‘‖ Journal of 
Democracy 11, no. 4 (October 1, 2000): 37–57, doi:10.1353/jod.2000.0088. 
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 Furthermore, Stepan also suggested that to apply democracy is to apply the 
―twin toleration‖ between elected government and religious institution. The lesson 
he took from Western European democracy was no more hostile separation 
between state and church implemented in there. He stated to apply democracy 
does not necessarily mean that we have to apply secularism or to build a strict 
wall between state and church. One thing we have to implement is the ―twin 
toleration.‖ It means that both elected government and religious institution should 
be free from each other. On the one side, Government should respect the right of 
citizens to privately practice religion, on the other, religious institution also are 
not supposed to have privileged prerogatives to mandate public policy to 
democratically elected government.
18
 
   Let us now turn to the case of local government, such as Noer Tjahya as 
district leader and Pemda/Pemkab policy as a whole. First, having considered 
Tjahya‘s attempt to increase his popularity to win the re-election through 
providing support to anti Shiite movement, it indicates that as government he was 
unable to implement the ―twin toleration‖ and democracy in terms of respecting 
citizens to privately worship and protecting minority. It also can be seen from his 
speech saying that Shiite community is deviant; hence they have to stop practicing 
their teachings and asked the police to drive them away if still practicing it.   In 
favour of his popularity, he took the side of majority to show that he had the same 
interest as did they have. This unneutrality of government is incompatible with 
democracy system that should be implemented in multicultural country.  
  Second, it is getting worse when the local government decided to relocate 
Shiite community to Siduarjo in order to create harmony and to avoid violence. 
This kind of solution explains that to achieve harmony and to avoid social conflict 
among religious adherents, we have to abolish differences by abolishing some 
groups which are different from mainstream and making them as same as 
mainstream is. This relocation is explicit evidence that the government 
representing the state did not protect minority for the sake of protecting religious 
freedom. 
 The next is court. Based on the data I got, the people in Sampang claimed 
Tajul Muluk and his followers is deviant, but the verdict of the court was that he 
was guilty because of his statement of ―Qur‘an is not original.‖ This indicates that 
the court was unable to prove that he and his followers are deviant. Different 
claim about Shiite deviancy from some expert witnesses also led the court cannot 
claim whether or not Tajul and his followers are deviant. This also means that 
they are not deviant and should be allowed to practice their teachings in Sampang. 
But the fact that government relocate them is incompatible with the result of the 
court and UUD 1945 about religious freedom.  
 Furthermore, his penalty was increased to be four years after proposing 
cassation to the higher court, because he was claimed guilty for being the cause of 
conflict escalation, as mentioned above. This shows that the court victimised the 
victim. How can Tajul Muluk as a victim of those who burn his and his follower‘s 
house, those who violate his religious freedom be guilty for causing this conflict 
                                                          
18
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escalation? How can practicing certain belief that does not violate democracy and 
other‘s right be the cause of conflict escalation? In fact, there were provocation, 
hate speech done by other including Rois Hukama and Nur Tjhaya. But in 
contrast, Rois Hukama was free from any penalty. 
      There was eksaminasi 
19
 in 10th September 2012 stating that there has 
been formal law abusing in the process of Tajul Muluk judgment. One of them 
was that the court only had witnesses who had tension with him in this conflict to 
be the basic of court‘s decision. This means the court pick not neutrally witness 
that led court‘s decision became weak.20 Since Tajul Muluk was claimed guilty 
based on this weak decision, it indicates the court as state‘s institution that should 
implement law and justice among all citizens is weak and undemocratic. The 
argument is because the implication is violation of citizen‘s right to have 
appropriate life in a country. No one should simplify this case, because living in 
prison based on the victimization of victim done by the court as state‘s institution 
is not simple.  
  
F. Public Reason 
 Regarding the term of ―public reason,‖ I would like to include what John 
Rawl said: 
―The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral 
and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic 
government‘s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In 
short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood.‖21  
 In addition, he perceived that since we live in countries which have 
plurality of conflicting reasonable doctrines, which are different from each other, 
we find difficulties in obtaining agreement on comprehensive doctrine. Hence, 
there should be reasonable universal reason that can be accepted by all of citizens. 
In this case, he purposed the idea of politically reasonable addressed to citizens as 
citizens. Furthermore, Rawl also suggested what it means by such reason is 
public: fundamental political justice questioning constitutional essential and 
matter of basic justice, and its nature and content are public. About political right 
and liberties may be written in constitution and interpreted in Supreme Court or 
similar institution.
22
 So according to this theory, in relation to Indonesia, there 
should be one reasonable idea which is universal and can be accepted by all of 
citizens contextually, in order to build democratic country where each citizen may 
respect rights of others‘. Having this in mind, there actually has been this kind of 
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 Eksaminasi is Indonesian law term (derived from English; examination). It is a process 
of examining, by some scholars or practitioners, court‘s product whether or not there are some 
procedural mistakes or abusing of justice principle in court‘s decisions. However, it does not 
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idea founded by Indonesian‘s founding fathers, which is Pancasila. UUD 1945 is 
also, in my view, considered as the idea of public reason constitutionally written 
in which people from different ethnics, religions, beliefs, and any other things are 
protected by the state. 
 Public reason should also have, at least, three political forums where each 
citizen should seek reasonable ideas when involving in this forum.
23
 The First, the 
discourse of judges in their discussion court. In my opinion, the process of Tajul 
Muluk‘s judgement by the court is included in this discourse. In this case, the 
court actually has tried to make the decision reasonable by claiming that he was 
guilty for stating ―Qur‘an is not original.‖ It might be reasonable if one claims it 
as insulting. In contrast, it would be unreasonable if the court claimed him guilty 
for his deviancy based on MUI fatwa. This fatwa does not represent the voice of 
Muslims as a whole or even more all citizens. However, some scholars and 
activists still perceived that this court‘s decision is weak. One of the reasons is the 
fact that Tajul‘s penalty was increased became four years jailed based on claim 
that he has become the cause of dispute escalation. If it is so, then this 
victimisation of the victim is publicly unreasonable in terms of protecting the 
victim‘s right as equal citizen as others. 
 Second, the discourse of government officials. Government officials, in 
Sampang context, could mean local government/pemda/pemkab. Seeing that this 
government also played a role in escalating the dispute and did not protect Shiite 
minority in Sampang, by supporting anti Shiite movement through speech 
(Tjahya‘s speech), relocating them to Siduarjo, and asking them to stop practicing 
religious activities, I failed to see that the local government‘s policies and 
activities towards this minority was reasonable in public. It might be reasonable 
for only their side. 
 The last is the discourse of candidate for public office.
24
 The way Tjhaya 
increased his popularity for the new re-election in Sampang through supporting 
anti Shiite community, considered as public interest, was unreasonable publicly. 
How can a leader of district, as body of the state, side and support certain 
community and violate the other rather than protecting all of his people? 
 Furthermore, the idea of public reason should not belong to only certain 
background culture with its own non-public reason.
25
 Having considered this in 
mind, thus the idea of public reason can be from either secular or religious, but 
each who brings it should make it reasonable in public and may be based on 
public interest. Each should make others sure that this idea is what they need for 
the sake of public interest, specifically for the sake of a country. 
 Thus, let us see whether MUI as civic group and its fatwa are public 
reason or not. Since MUI actually represents the voice of Muslims majority who 
are Sunni, it can be seen from how they judged Shiite as deviant through the 
standardisation of Sunni; I would say it is problematic if we want to relate to the 
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idea of public reason suggested by John Rawl. Because of MUI itself is civil 
society, and it is included in the discourse of government officials as one of public 
political forum. Hence, Rawl perceived;  
―The idea of public reason does not apply to background culture with its 
many forms of Nob-public reason or to media of any kind.‖  26 
 As civil society in the public political forum that deal with Muslims matter 
in daily life, funded by the government, and should support democracy, how can 
MUI judge Shiite in Sampang as deviant through Sunni‘s background culture? 
And consequently, it strengthens the anti-Shiite movement in Sampang and in 
many other places in Indonesia. It also became one of justification for those who 
conducted violence towards Shiite community. So I would argue that MUI‘s 
interpretation of blasphemy is not a public reason. It only belongs to certain 
background culture that should not be taken as account in justifying violent act 
towards other groups.   
 However, there were attempts to make it reasonable in public if we see 
MUI recommendation in its fatwa of Shiite. They recommended the government 
to stop Shiite community to stop all of activities and close their offices in order to 
create political stability and to keep the unity of Republic of Indonesia.
27
 They 
framed it as well to make it as public interest; in contrast, their way of judging 
Shiite is deviant is not reasonable in public political forum.  
 
 
G. Contestation between National and Islamic identity  
Indonesia has been experiencing Islamization to this day and it is the 
process that never ends. This process also means a struggle for hegemony and in 
some ways for power. However, we have to note that Islamic party never gained a 
full control of the state meaning that political Islam has never won. However, the 
grass-root level Islamization has never stoped through culture, law, and politic, 
such as hijab as both fashion and life style and the codification of Islamic law into 
possitive law as represented in Religious Court, MUI, and Syariah District 
Regulation. The codification happens through negotiations between political 
elites. This Islamization then contributes to the contestation between national and 
Islamic identity in some ways, although many religious leaders and Islamic 
communities have agreed on being Muslims and nationalists at the same time. It 
becomes a contest when certain religious community feel threatened by other 
community, such as Shiite in Sampang, and then invited religious authoroties such 
as MUI and religious leaders to judge Shiite and brought the case to the court, and 
asked the state to stop them for practicing some rituals and spreading their 
teachings. As a result, The Government relocated them to Sidoarjo, the other city 
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that far from their hometown. What happened was that Religious communities 
judged other as deviant and then invited and pressured the state to be on their side.  
If we discuss what the national identity is then we should take Pancasila, 
Bhineka Tunggal Ika, and Constitution into account, where Shiite community is 
basically supposed to be protected by the state. The case of Sampang shows how 
Muslims majorites think of Islamic orthodoxy where the state has to involve in 
constructing and running it. It was a struggle of the orthodox Islamic identity in 
public sphere, instead of Democratic Islamic country.  When the body of the state 
such as Court, Police, and District leader are pressured and forced to response to 
this, what kind of identity did they represent? Focusing the Court and District 
leader, Nur Tjahya, they indicated the un-neutrality, which means aligning 
themselves to Sunni-majorities.  
Looking at another case, Identity contestation is part of nation-building, 
such as that happening in Malaysia where communities try to define what being 
Malays mean. However, Malaysia case is somewhat different in the sense that it 
defined in its post-colonial constitution that being Malays means having three 
pillars, such as Muslim religion, Malay language, and aristocratic Government of 
sultanate. These pillars should be embodied in every Malaysia citizens. What 
interesting is that there is a contestation within Islamic identity itself among 
radical and moderate dakwahist. Both groups have attempted to define what being 
Muslims mean, what kind of Islam is authentic, and what being Malaysians mean 
with their Islam as religion.
28
 This case indicates that identity contestation is 
something unavoidable, yet the most important thing is that whether or not the 
contestation is in democratic ways. Indeed, this religion-state contestation has a 
significant effect in the condition of religious liberty in Indonesia. This 
designation has had various discriminatory effects on its adherents, which waters 
down significantly the guarantee of religious freedom in Indonesia.
29
   
 
H. Conclusion   
 Looking at the alignments of some state‘s institution, such as local 
government, and court in responding people‘s claim about deviancy of certain 
community, which later led to violence, it can be considered as undemocratic and 
publicly unreasonable. As I have mentioned above about protecting minority 
rights in democratic country, I failed to see that state‘s institution succeed in 
protecting minority right and tolerate their religious freedom as citizens. Thus, 
what actually happened was undemocratic and publicly unreasonable way of the 
state in responding to the claim of deviancy from certain group. 
 If we see MUI as civic group and civil society that should suport 
democracy, it becomes problematic when producing such fatwa that supports and 
strengthens others‘ right violation. It might be an institution representing Sunni 
majority of Muslims‘ voice, but cannot recommend the state to stop other from 
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practicing what they believe, which is in public political forum. Hence, the 
existence of MUI as an institution representing Sunni Muslims that wish Shiite 
community stop their rituals is undemocratic and publicly unreasonable. 
 Further, Noer Tjahya‘s alignments with Sunni majority in Sampang in 
claiming deviancy of Shiite community, thus they should stop their activities or 
go out of Madura, shows his powerlessness in implementing twin toleration in the 
country struggling for democracy. Besides, relocating Shiite community from 
their homeland to Sidoarjo, is a complex undemocratic way of local government 
in equally treating all citizens, even there is such claim of deviancy towards 
certain community.    
 The last is the role of the court. As one of political forum that should 
publicly reasonable in favour of democracy, the victimization of Tajul Muluk 
whose right is violated is one indicating unreasonable way of the court in 
protecting minority rights, thus, it also violates the written constitution UUD 1945 
as a part of public reasoning and is undemocratic  
 Answering how state respond to religious groups‘ judgment of ―deviant‖ 
at the end of this paper, I would say generally that state has implied favouritism 
towards certain community by being an ally of that community and then violate 
other‘s right which is actually written in a constitution as a part of public reason. 
Besides, the state also gave a special privilege for Sunni Muslims to judge other 
through MUI. This is what I consider as undemocratic and unreasonable 
favouritism towards Sunni-Muslims  
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